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INTERFACE:
THE PUSH AND PULL OF PATENTS
Peter Lee*
INTRODUCTION

The title of this Symposium, When Worlds Collide: IntellectualProperty
at the Interface Between Systems of Knowledge Creation, captures an
essential feature of university patenting. University patents mediate the
intersection of two worlds-academics and industry-that differ
substantially in structure, motivation, and purpose. Notwithstanding their
constitutional and cultural differences, academics and industry play vital
roles in technological development, and patents play a vital role in
facilitating exchange between them.
Greater engagement between
academics and industry, however, may have certain deleterious
consequences.
As several of the Symposium contributions reveal,
university patenting raises deep concerns over the increasing
commercialization of academic science. This essay first explores these
concerns and then identifies a subtle but powerful countervailing dynamic.
Highlighting the concept of "interface," this essay emphasizes that patents
facilitate bidirectional normative exchange between universities and
industry. While university patenting may accelerate the commercialization
of academic science, it also creates opportunities for academic institutions
to project their unique normative commitments into the marketplace.
This essay explores these issues through the lens of three Symposium
pieces dealing with university research and commercial science. Part I
presents a brief overview of these contributions. Drawing from economic
theory, empirical methods, and norms analysis, Professors Brett
Frischmann, Jay Kesan, and Katherine Strandburg artfully explore the
structural, institutional, and communal implications of commercial
encroachments into academic research. While varied in their perspectives,
these contributions articulate related concerns over the potential for profit
motives and financial considerations to compromise the traditional structure
and objectives of university research.
* Acting Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Brett Frischmann, Jay Kesan, and Katherine Strandburg for organizing this Symposium and
for graciously inviting me to contribute. I am grateful to all of the Symposium participants
for their thoughtful insights and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I wish to
extend special thanks to Keith Aoki and Bhaven Sampat for their critical commentary and
encouragement.
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Part II extends and complements these observations by focusing on
patents as bidirectional "interfaces." While commercial interests exert a
"pull" on universities, patents also provide a vehicle by which universities
may proactively "push" their institutional norms and policy objectives into
the private sector and wider society. This essay builds on insights from
each Symposium contribution to reveal that universities are using patents to
advance nonmarket interests in the context of technology transfer.
Part III addresses deeper normative questions raised by the push and pull
of patents. For example, is it truly problematic for universities to orient
themselves toward "applied" rather than "basic" research?' What is the
proper role of universities in advancing social and distributive ends through
technology transfer practices? Without providing conclusive answers, I
simply suggest that any response is likely to be multifaceted and must take
into account the unique backgrounds and missions of particular universities.
I. THE INCREASING COMMERCIALIZATION OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH

In The Pull of Patents, Professor Frischmann explores an
underappreciated structural (perhaps infrastructural) implication of
increased university patenting. 2 Such patenting has attracted a wide range
of academic commentary-much of it critical. 3 In the most immediate
sense, university patents may inhibit access to foundational research
resources, thus impeding scientific and technological progress. 4 More
fundamentally, such patenting may accelerate the erosion of highly
productive academic norms that have traditionally emphasized freely
sharing research results. 5 Toward the most fundamental end of the

1. As I argue later, the distinction between basic and applied research can be quite
blurry, particularly in "Pasteur's Quadrant." DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR'S QUADRANT:
BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997); Francis Narin et al., The
Increasing Linkage Between U.S. Technology and Public Science, 26 RES. POL'Y 317, 317
(1997); Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES.
POL'Y 455, 457 (2004); see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
2. Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143 (2009).
3. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Participationof Life-Science Faculty in Research
Relationshipswith Industry, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1734, 1738 (1996) (addressing decreases
in academic productivity); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The
Price of the University's Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 793-98 (2004) (reviewing DEREK
BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(2003)) (addressing weakening of academic freedom); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The
Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39 (addressing changes in university
research agendas). See generally BOK, supra; JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE
CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005).
4. See generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) (observing that
a proliferation of exclusive rights may lead to wasteful underutilization of protected
resources).
5. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 225 (1987) (describing academic norms
discouraging exclusive rights in research discoveries). See generally ROBERT K. MERTON,
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 273-75 (1973)

2009]

INTERFACE: THE PUSHAND PULL OF PATENTS

2227

spectrum, Professor Frischmann explores how patenting may alter the
internal structure and resource allocation of universities themselves.
Drawing from earlier work on commons and infrastructure, 6 Professor
Frischmann argues that the demand-side pull of patents may lead
universities to favor research pathways that generate appropriable (i.e.,
patentable) results. This may fundamentally skew university infrastructure
toward applied, readily commercialized research at the expense of basic
7
research that generates greater long-term spillovers.
Professor Kesan provides some empirical corroboration for Professor
Frischmann's concerns. In TransferringInnovation, Professor Kesan first
presents a history of university technology transfer policy as well as an
overview of current controversies arising from increased universityindustry relations. 8 He then engages in the difficult work of quantifying the
performance of university technology transfer offices. Analyzing survey
data from the Association of University Technology Managers, he
concludes that revenue maximization constitutes the overriding focus of
most university technology transfer activities. Accordingly, universities are
likely to underutilize alternative mechanisms of technology transfer-such
as forming start-up companies-that may not generate direct revenues.
Professor Kesan's findings are sobering, and he concludes with a
prescriptive call for universities to adopt technology transfer strategies that
maximize knowledge dissemination rather than profits.
In User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between
Academic and Industry Research, Professor Strandburg explores strategies
for maintaining access to research tools 9-technological inputs to scientific
experimentation-in areas where basic and applied research overlap. 10 She
extends earlier work on user innovation l I to consider the powerful role that
nonmarket incentives and sharing norms play in generating and
disseminating research tools. She introduces several distinctions that vastly
clarify current policy debates. First, she distinguishes between "dualpurpose" research tools, which are both basic research aids as well as direct
subjects of commercial exploitation, and "garden variety" research tools,
which only facilitate basic research. 12 While commercial exploitation and
(describing traditional scientific norms of universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism).
6. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 956 (2005).
7. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007).

8. Jay P. Kesan, TransferringInnovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169 (2009).
9. "Research tool" is a term that resists simple and consistent definition. See Katherine
J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary Between Academic and
Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2248 (2009).
10. Id. (noting, for example, that genetic assays, chemicals, and imaging techniques may
have both research and commercial uses).
11. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implicationsfor Patent
Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008).
12. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 2266, 2271-74.
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patenting will likely lead to disclosure of the former, private firms have
incentives to practice the latter in secret. Second, she distinguishes between
"do-it-yourself' research tools and tools comprising tangible materials.
Whereas publication may be adequate for disseminating "do-it-yourself'
research tools, sharing tangible materials generally entails much greater
effort and expense. Finally, she distinguishes between academic and
industrial scientists, who often differ substantially in their sharing costs and
preferences. Among other policy recommendations, Professor Strandburg
proposes codifying a research use exception to ensure sharing of "do-ityourself' research tools. 13 She also proposes lowering sharing costs
through utilizing centralized deposits, differential licensing of dual-purpose
research tools for academic and commercial use, and standardized material
14
transfer agreements.
A common concern running through these contributions is that
commercial interests are increasingly influencing university research and
patenting. 15 Professor Kesan finds that most offices of technology transfer
are oriented toward maximizing licensing income, even at the expense of
other modes of technology transfer that may better promote
commercialization of university inventions. Professor Frischmann cautions
that increasing academic patenting, fueled by profit motives, may
fundamentally alter university infrastructure and research agendas.
Professor Strandburg recognizes that certain parties have strong incentives
to patent research tools, and she provides creative solutions for maintaining
the availability of such tools for academic research.
As several of the contributions recognize, however, there are mitigating
forces at work. For example, while private industry significantly pulls
university research toward commercial ends, the most significant funder of
university research-the federal government-has traditionally focused on
basic rather than applied research.1 6 Thus, the National Institutes of Health,
which provides about $30 billion per year for biomedical research, largely
funds fundamental biological investigations rather than research with
immediate commercial application. 17 Additionally, Professor Kesan's
observation that patent licensing by universities rarely generates significant
revenues would seem to challenge the notion that profit motives unduly
influence research agendas.' 8 However, today's state of affairs need not
persist tomorrow. In a world of declining public support for university
13. Id. at 2266-67.
14. Id. at 2268.
15. For a related criticism, see Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611 (2008).

16. See Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2146; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and
Private Development:
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1726 (1996).
17. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON AFFORDABILITY OF INVENTIONS
AND PRODUCTS 3 (2004).

18. Kesan, supra note 8, at 2181-84, 2188-89; see Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C.
Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 SCIENCE 1052, 1052 (2003).
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research and increased university-industry partnerships, 19 Professor
Frischmann's concerns over the pull of patents assume heightened urgency.
Furthermore, as Professor Strandburg observes, fundamental research and
20
commercial application increasingly overlap in several technical fields,
suggesting that interactions between university scientists and private firms
have become the norm. Given these developments, the pull of patents and
commercial interests on universities will in all likelihood increase.
II. THE PUSH OF PATENTS

The notion of "interface," however, suggests that university-industry
relations represent a two-way street. While patents, and the profits they
enable, clearly influence universities, patents also provide a vehicle for
universities to project their unique norms and objectives into the
marketplace.
The role of patents in pushing academic norms into the commercial
sphere is evident in an area that all three Symposium contributions address:
patenting of biomedical research tools. As noted, university and industry
patents on research tools-technological
inputs to scientific
experimentation-may potentially inhibit basic research. 21 While a de
facto experimental use exception prevents many patentees from suing
academic researchers for infringement, 22 universities are taking matters into
their own hands to prevent patent-enabled research holdup. In some cases,
universities are choosing to forgo patenting what Professor Strandburg
characterizes as "garden variety" research tools, which only serve as
research aids and are not subjects of commercial exploitation. 2 3 As one
example, universities are conscientiously choosing not to patent DNA
sequences that only serve as markers. 24 Thus in a "negative" fashion,
universities are advancing the norm of open science 2 5 by refraining from
patenting certain foundational research tools and thereby ensuring their
wide availability in the public domain.
Even when universities decide to patent a resource, they are pushing their
commitment to robust scientific research through their licensing policies.
First, universities are vastly enhancing the availability of research
technologies through nonexclusive licensing.
As Professor Kesan
describes, Stanford University and the University of California, San
19. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 8, at 2190 (describing the U.C. Berkeley partnership
with Novartis).

20. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 2251.
21. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 4.
22. See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 296; Strandburg, supra
note 9, at 2256; see also John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS INTHE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285,
324-28 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
23. Strandburg, supra note 9. at 2266-67.
24. Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions:
An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31, 33-34 (2006).
25. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 289.
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Francisco, nonexclusively licensed the Cohen-Boyer patents covering
recombinant DNA technology, thus facilitating widespread adoption of this
basic research tool. 26 As this example illustrates, nonexclusive licensing is
particularly appropriate for "upstream," infrastructural resources that
facilitate myriad "downstream" applications. 27 Furthermore, as in the case
of recombinant DNA technology, the decision by Stanford and UCSF to
grant royalty-free nonexclusive licenses for academic research facilitated
This method of use-based price
even higher adoption rates. 28
discrimination--charging higher fees for commercial rather than academic
use--conceptually parallels the de facto and 29statutory experimental use
exceptions that Professor Strandburg advocates.
Second, even within the context of exclusive licenses, universities are
advancing the norm of open science. In exclusive (and nonexclusive)
licenses, universities are ensuring that patented university inventions
remain widely available for noncommercial research purposes. For
example, as Professors Frischmann and Strandburg note, a consortium led
by Stanford University recently recommended that universities differentiate
between licensing patented research tools for use as opposed to sale.30 In
this manner, academic researchers may continue to use dual-purpose
research tools in their laboratories, but only an exclusive licensee may sell
them as commercial products. Furthermore, it is becoming quite common
for university offices of technology transfer to reserve research rights for
themselves and other nonprofit institutions for inventions licensed to the
private sector. 3 1 Thus, even when a private firm has exclusively licensed a
university patent, it may not sue unlicensed scientists who infringe that
patent in the course of conducting noncommercial research. These
contractual mechanisms provide a legal backbone to the "ignore patents"
norm already prevalent among university researchers and establish a
limited, "private law" experimental use exception.
In addition to advancing the norm of open science, universities are also
using patents to push other nonmarket objectives. For example, universities
are leveraging their patents on essential medicines to enhance the
availability of these technologies to underserved communities. This
development has been most visible in the context of university patents on
26. Kesan, supra note 8, at 2173-74.

27. Id. at 2196-97; see also Frischmann, supra note 6.
28. See Kesan, supra note 8, at 2202-03.
29. Strandburg, supra note 9.
30. Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2166; Strandburg, supra note 9, at 2267; see also
ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN
3
(2007),
available at
http://newsLICENSING
UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY

service.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/ gifs/whitepaper.pdf.
31. See Pressman et al., supra note 24, at 35; see, e.g., Board of Trs. of the Stanford
2
(n.d),
available
at
Junior
Univ.,
Exclusive
Agreement
Leland
Harvard University Office of
http://otl.stanford.edu/industry/resources/exclusive.pdf.;
Technology Development, Licensing Harvard Patent Rights: A Guideline to the Essentials
License Agreements,
http://www.techtransfer.harvard.edu/resources/
of Harvard's
guidelines/license/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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AIDS medicines. 32 One well-documented case involves Yale University,
which patented stavudine, a medicine used in antiretroviral combination
therapy. Yale had exclusively licensed the patent to Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS), which manufactured the medicine. With the urging of M~decins
Sans Fronti~res, Yale and BMS entered into an agreement whereby they
would permit the sale of generics in South Africa; additionally, BMS
agreed to lower substantially the price for stavudine throughout subSaharan Africa for governments and nonprofit organizations, thus
enhancing access to this essential resource. 33 Another example where
universities are leveraging patents to promote public health arises in the
context of the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA). 34 PIPRA is a consortium of over forty universities and research
institutions that aggregates agricultural biotechnology patents and facilitates
their exploitation in the developing world. 35 Such measures prevent patent
holdup and reflect universities' commitment to use patents to advance
36
public health, particularly in low-income countries.
While Professor Kesan's observation that universities unduly privilege
revenue maximization over commercialization is worrisome, some
universities are structuring their licensing practices to actively promote
commercialization. For example, universities are increasingly utilizing
"diligence milestones" that require licensees to demonstrate tangible
progress toward commercializing university-generated inventions. 37 These
efforts preempt the threat that nonpracticing entities (sometimes referred to
as patent trolls) 38 will license university intellectual property with no plans
to actually produce commercial goods and services.
These considerations shed new light on the role of patents as interfaces
between universities and industry. Professor Frischmann reminds us that
universities are increasingly functioning as market actors. 39 This may
clearly cause concern, but it also raises unique opportunities. While
commercial interests and profit motives certainly exert a pull on
universities, academic institutions may also utilize patents to push their
unique norms into the marketplace. Universities, which control valuable
intellectual property, maintain a significant degree of leverage vis-a-vis
private industry, and they can utilize this leverage to drive particular policy
32. See generally Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005).

33. Id. at 1034-37.
34. See generally Richard C. Atkinson et al., Intellectual Property Rights: Public Sector
Collaborationfor Agricultural IP Management, 301 SCIENCE 174 (2003).
35. See Keith Aoki, "FreeSeeds, Not Free Beer": ParticipatoryPlantBreeding, Open
Source Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.

2275 (2009).
36. See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's Ass?
IntellectualPropertyand Social Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (2007).

37. Pressman et al., supra note 24, at 38.
38. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
39. Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2147.
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objectives. For example, a commercial firm may have to accept a
noncommercial research exception as a condition of exclusively licensing
valuable university technology. Furthermore, as Professor Strandburg
suggests, university researchers may engage in a "tit-for-tat or market
transactions with industry scientists seeking access to their research
material innovations. '40 As Professor Frischmann observes, "[u]niversities
remain in the driver's seat and may decide which road to take and at what
speed."'4 1 While we consider the ways that commercial interests, via
patents, may alter the internal structure and resource allocation of
universities, it is also useful to consider how universities are using patents
to help generate and distribute infrastructural resources throughout society
at large.
III. NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF THE PUSH AND PULL OF PATENTS
We arrive, then, at another interface, or perhaps more accurately, a
historical inflection point. While distinguishing historical epochs is always
fraught with difficulty, one might plausibly contend that we are on the cusp
of a new era in technology transfer policy. Drawing from Professor
Kesan's timeline, during the "pre-Bayh-Dole" era, universities as a general
matter did not aggressively pursue intellectual property rights. (There are,
of course, exceptions; as Professor Kesan notes, the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation has had a long history of managing intellectual
property since the 1940s.)42 The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 198043
ushered in a second era characterized by vastly increased university
licensing as well as concomitant rises in technology transfer offices,
licensing revenues, and, most controversially, commercial influences on
universities. 44 I would suggest that we may be on the verge of a third
epoch, which I would characterize as "qualified Bayh-Dole." Universities
still retain the right to patent taxpayer-funded inventions, but they do not
exercise that right indiscriminately. In some cases, universities forbear
patenting upstream research tools so as to enhance their widespread
40. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 2268.
41. Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2165.
42. Kesan, supra note 8, at 2171. See generally Charles Weiner, Patenting and
Academic Research: HistoricalCase Studies, 12 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 50 (1987).
43. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)).
44. As several scholars have noted, passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was not the only
catalytic event that spurred greater university patenting. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court
expansively construed patentable subject matter so as to include many products of the
nascent biotechnology industry. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). In
addition, advances in molecular biology revealed a relatively clear path from "basic"
discoveries to commercial products, thus enhancing opportunities for university patenting.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 1013, 1014 (2006). Indeed, David Mowery shows an increase in university
patenting prior to the 1980 passage of Bayh-Dole. See David C. Mowery, The Bayh-Dole
Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S. Universities: Chicken, Egg, or
Something

Else?,

in

UNIVERSITY

ENTREPRENEURSHIP

AND

TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER:

PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39,44-48 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).
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availability.
In other cases, universities are conscientiously crafting
licenses, reserving research rights, and aggregating intellectual property to
advance open science, public health, and commercialization objectives.
These developments raise a host of deeper normative questions
concerning university technology transfer. First, what are the normative
implications of the pull of patents? As Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
inquired in her comments on Professor Frischmann's piece, is it such a bad
development for universities to configure themselves to produce outputs
that are appropriable via market mechanisms? 45
This question is
particularly relevant to research in "Pasteur's Quadrant," where basic
inquiry and commercial applications frequently overlap. 46
Basic
knowledge in fields such as metallurgy, chemical and electrical
engineering, and computer science have often arisen from attempts to solve
real-world problems. 4 7 In such fields, it is conceivable (though far from
certain) that marshalling university research to generate applied
technologies may also substantially advance "basic" science.
Second, what are the normative implications of the push of patents?
These developments raise the question of whether and to what extent
universities should promote particular policy objectives-such as
maintaining a research commons or advancing distributive aims-in their
technology transfer practices. This question is ultimately a component of a
broader inquiry into the proper role of universities in society. Obviously,
such a question is beyond the scope of this essay, and I attempt no
comprehensive response. I simply hope to add to the discussion by
suggesting a few points for consideration.
The three Symposium contributions considered here are bound by a
number of themes, and a relatively subtle one is the theme of distinctions.
As Professor Frischmann notes, the dynamics of industry pull may vary
based on the particular research area implicated; computer science,
biotechnology, and materials science may feel the pull of patents quite
differently. 4 8 Furthermore, as Professor Strandburg aptly demonstrates, the
appropriate policy response to access constraints on patented research tools
may vary depending on the nature of the tool and the community seeking to
share it. 49 Furthermore, distinctions between academic and commercial
uses and attendant price discrimination are key to enabling optimal access
to such resources. Professor Kesan analyzes aggregate data on university
technology transfer, but he emphasizes that the "role, structure, and
45. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Pauline Newman Professor of Law, New York Univ.

Sch. of Law, Remarks at Fordham Law Review Symposium: When Worlds Collide:
Intellectual Property Laws at the Interface Between Systems of Knowledge Creation (Oct.
31, 2008); see Adam Jaffe et al., Academic Science and Entrepreneurship: Dual Engines of
Growth?, 63 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 573, 573 (2007).
46. See STOKES, supra note I (noting that while biomedical research seeks to advance
basic science, it is intrinsically aimed at facilitating practical applications).
47. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 459.
48. Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2145.
49. Strandburg, supra note 9, at 2271-74.
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business model of university TTOs can vary significantly depending on the
university and the academic discipline involved in the technology transfer
activity that is taking place." 50 Indeed, individual universities approach
technology transfer very differently. For example, the University of
California and Columbia University have been particularly aggressive in
seeking and asserting patent protection. 5 1 By contrast, owing to its unique
institutional culture, Johns Hopkins University-a major recipient of
research funds-has been reluctant to assert intellectual property rights on
52
its discoveries.
Drawing on this last observation, I join Professor Frischmann and others
in emphasizing that determining a university's "proper" approach to
technology transfer is a highly contextual inquiry. 53 Universities are far
from homogenous; they arise from a wide range of histories, serve a large
group of constituencies, and embody a broad set of aspirations. These
factors can meaningfully inform a particular university's approach to the
push and pull of patents. At the grossest level, the distinction between
Relative to public
private and public universities may be salient.
universities, boards of trustees of private institutions may have greater
flexibility to determine an intellectual property strategy unconstrained by
obligations to taxpayers and state stakeholders. Additionally, elite private
institutions that pride themselves on pursuing knowledge "for its own sake"
may be particularly resistant to embracing an applied orientation.
At the other end of the spectrum, public universities arguably bear a
more immediate obligation to the public that they serve. This sense of
public obligation may cut both ways with respect to asserting proprietary
rights on university discoveries. On the one hand, the "public" nature of
these institutions may weigh toward ensuring that discoveries are freely
available to all. On the other hand, university leadership may view
licensing revenue as a legitimate means to offset taxpayer support and
tuition increases. 54 Additionally, some universities may view closer
collaborations with private firms as intrinsically related to their traditional
mission to disseminate knowledge. 55 At the far end of the spectrum, many
50. Kesan, supranote 8, at 2179.
51. See Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Bernard Wysocki, Jr.,
College Try: Columbia's PursuitofPatent Riches Angers Companies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2004, at Al.
52. Gregory K. Sobolski et al., Technology Licensing: Lessons from the US Experience,
294 JAMA 3137, 3138 (2005).

53. See Fumio Kodama & Lewis M. Branscomb, University Research as an Engine for
Growth: How Realistic Is the Vision?, in INDUSTRIALIZING KNOWLEDGE 3, 14 (Lewis M.

Branscomb et al. eds., 1999); Frischmann, supra note 2, at 2165 ("I envision robust
competition among universities operating on different models and pursuing different
strategies, missions, and ideologies.").
54. Lemley, supra note 15, at 619-20.
55. Timothy L. Faley & Michael Sharer, Technology Transfer and Innovation:
Reexamining and Broadening the Perspective of the Transfer of Discoveries Resultingfrom
Government-SponsoredResearch, 3 COMP. TECH. TRANSFER & SOC'Y 109, 114 (2005).
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public universities are land-grant colleges. 56 Although the history and
character of these institutions vary considerably, 57 their origins suggest a
pragmatic orientation well-suited for serving "the industrial classes."
Of course, the past need not dictate the present or the future. It may be
the case that, notwithstanding their histories, most modem universities
operate quite similarly: they are teaching and research institutions that aim
to serve the public interest but also strive to raise revenue through
exploiting their intellectual property. Furthermore the "privatization" of
public universities is a well-recognized phenomenon, such that the publicprivate distinction may soon have little analytical value. That being said, in
the contemporary debate over the role of patents in technology transfer,
of the unique backgrounds and aims of universities may
some consideration
58
be useful.
CONCLUSION

The contributions to this Symposium demonstrate that commercial
pressures can exert a powerful pull on universities, with significant
implications for university infrastructure, income, and access to research
resources. However, patents are interfaces that facilitate bidirectional
exchange. Drawing on the insights of three Symposium contributions, I
suggest that universities should recognize the powerful role that patents and
technology transfer can play in pushing their institutional values into the
marketplace. Universities, in a very real sense, are in the "driver's seat"
and can marshal their assets to advance open science, public health, and
commercialization of new technologies. Such decisions, moreover, should
arise from a careful examination of a university's unique character, values,
and constituencies. The colliding worlds examined at this Symposium refer
not simply to monolithic "university" and "commercial" cultures, but to a
multiplicity of worlds within these sectors that may strive toward a
multiplicity of ends.

56. See Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 130, § 4, 12 Stat. 504 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 304
(2006)) (providing land grants to states for colleges "where the leading object shall be... to
teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts ... in
order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several
pursuits and professions in life"); Steven Brint, Creating the Future: 'New Directions' in
American Research Universities,43 MINERVA 23, 29 (2005).
57. See generally Vernon Carstensen, A Century of the Land-Grant Colleges, 33 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 30 (1962) (providing a history of land-grant colleges).
58. This normative inquiry necessarily implicates an institutional one. While university
leadership may espouse one intellectual policy, offices of technology transfer often practice
another. Given Professor Jay Kesan's findings that offices of technology transfer focus
primarily on maximizing revenues, university leadership should consider changing their
incentive structures and performance metrics to ensure that these offices act consistently
with centralized policy.
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